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ABSTRACT
For most of the post-war period, Europe’s capital markets remained largely closed to international capital ﬂows. This
paper explores the costs of this policy. Using an event-study methodology, I examine the extent to which restrictions of
current and capital account convertibility aﬀected stock returns. The delayed introduction of full currency convertibility
increased the cost of capital. Also, a string of measures designed to reduce capital mobility before the ultimate collapse
of the Bretton Woods System had considerable negative eﬀects. These ﬁndings oﬀer an explanation for the mounting
evidence suggesting that capital account liberalization facilitates growth. Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
JEL CODE: F21; G15
KEY WORDS: Cost of capital; liberalization; current account; capital account; convertibility
The Asian crisis of 1997/98 provided fresh arguments for critics of free capital movement. The severity of
the contraction in East Asia appeared to suggest that some form of capital controls could help to isolate
economies from volatile short-term capital ﬂows (Edwards, 1998). Paul Krugman (1999) put it succinctly:
‘... we will have to turn the clock at least part of the way back: to limit capital ﬂows for countries that are
unsuitable for either currency unions or free ﬂoating’. Limiting capital outﬂows}as implemented by
Malaysia, for example}is the primary focus of Krugman’s proposal (Krugman, 1998). Restrictions on
inﬂows have been advocated as an alternative (Eichengreen, 1999). The case of Chile is often cited as an
example of the successful implementation of capital controls, combining reduced volatility with strong
macroeconomic performance (Massad, 1998). In particular, the authorities appear to have had some
success in avoiding contagion from emerging market crises (Edwards, 1999). Even in industrialized
countries, the markedly higher volatility of real interest rates following the demise of the Bretton Woods
System led to calls for a reintroduction of pegs vis-! a a-vis the dollar.
1
Arguments in favour of greater restrictions have partly gained in inﬂuence because, until recently, there
was little evidence that they do any harm. Using standard growth regressions, Rodrik (1998) found that
capital controls have no measurable eﬀect on growth, investment or inﬂation. On balance, he argues that
unfettered capital ﬂows create signiﬁcant risks without clearly discernible beneﬁts.
2 Indirectly, work on the
link between ﬁnance and growth also appears to strengthen this conclusion. Levine and Zervos (1998a,b)
argued that while stock market size and liquidity, and the size of the banking sector have predictive power
for future growth, the degree of integration into the world capital market does not.
3 The post-war
experience of Western Europe has also been used to argue that ﬁnancial repression, when used to stabilize
exchange rates, may even produce important beneﬁts. Spectacular rates of growth during the years 1950–73
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Contract/grant sponsor: the Spanish Education Ministry (MCYT).coincided with numerous restrictions on capital mobility. Wyplosz (1999), for example, argues that this was
no accident. Capital controls, combined with credit ceilings and ﬁxed exchange rates, contributed as much
as 0.9% p.a. to economic growth during the period 1960–95. This is all the more remarkable since evidence
from Italy, France and Belgium suggests that capital controls, while successful in reducing real interest
rates, also raised the volatility of nominal interest rates and reduced competition in the ﬁnancial sector
(Wyplosz, 1999).
Support for a positive eﬀect of capital account liberalization comes from recent studies using a more
nuanced indicator of capital control intensity developed by Quinn (Arteta et al., 2001; Edison et al., 2002;
Edwards, 2001; Eichengreen, 2001; Quinn, 1997). Edwards (2001) argues that ﬁnancial liberalization
is beneﬁcial for more advanced countries, but that emerging markets may not proﬁt from a free
capital account. Arteta et al. (2001) emphasize that the sequencing of reform matters, and that beneﬁcial
eﬀects can be expected if capital account convertibility follows trade liberalization. In contrast, Klein and
Olivei (1999) ﬁnd that measures of ﬁnancial depth normally associated with growth only beneﬁt from
liberalization in developing countries. No such association is apparent for more advanced countries (Klein
and Olivei, 1999).
In tracing the eﬀects of capital account liberalizations, interest has primarily focused on the eﬀects of
capital controls on the level and volatility of interest rates.
4 In cases where capital outﬂows are
restricted}the vast majority of cases}interest rates are lowered artiﬁcially. The beneﬁts of lower rates
have to be weighed against the potential ineﬃciencies of credit rationing (Wyplosz, 1999). Only if inﬂows
are stiﬂed are interest rates driven above their equilibrium levels, and it becomes relatively easy to ﬁnd
negative eﬀects. Edwards (1999) is one of the few empirical contributions examining the consequences of
lower capital mobility. He concludes that, in Chile between 1991 and 1998, capital controls burdened small
and medium-size ﬁrms with markedly higher rates of interest. At the same time, there appears to have been
no clear beneﬁt in terms of lower interest rate volatility.
5
In this debate, one factor has received almost no attention}the possibility that capital controls may
increase the cost of equity ﬁnance. From a theoretical point of view, the consequences should be negative.
Greater opportunities for diversiﬁcation of risk normally allow countries joining the world capital market
to reduce their cost of equity capital. Country-speciﬁc risk can partly be diversiﬁed. Under fairly general
assumptions, Stulz (1999) shows that, if standard IAPM holds, globalization will reduce the equity
premium in a country. Unless the covariance of a country’s equity returns with the world portfolio is very
high, opportunities for risk diversiﬁcation should ensure that the cost of capital falls as a result of greater
integration into the world equity market (Stulz, 1999). Using an event-study approach, a growing literature
suggests that the empirical implications are borne out. The type of liberalizations considered typically
include the introduction of country funds, ADR listings, or the revocation of limits on foreign ownership.
6
Recent studies (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Henry, 2000) demonstrate that stock market liberalizations are
systematically followed by large positive equity returns. As long as future cash ﬂow is constant, this
indicates a reduction in the cost of equity capital. Evidence that dividend yields fall as a result of
liberalizations reinforces this ﬁnding (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000). Also, changes in the investability index
compiled by the IFC tend to have a signiﬁcant impact on the yield of equities. Reductions of restrictions
often lead to large capital gains (Bekaert, 1995). In addition to reductions in the cost of capital via lower
risk, there are also good theoretical reasons to assume that integration into the world capital market
facilitates investment in projects that are more risky, but oﬀer greater pay-oﬀs (Obstfeld, 1994). One recent
contribution that explicitly examines the connection between controls and the cost of capital is Kaplan and
Rodrik (2001). They argue that the imposition of capital controls actually facilitated an early recovery of
the Malaysian stock market, suggesting a reduction in the cost of capital (Kaplan and Rodrik, 2001). Their
results, however, depend on a highly idiosyncratic way of controlling for the general timing of recovery in
Asia.
7
Stock market liberalizations such as the introduction of ADRs on foreign exchanges, country funds, etc.
are amongst the most prominent measures a country can adopt to open its capital market to the world.
However, they only represent one part of a wider spectrum of steps that can be taken. The introduction of
current account convertibility normally represents a ﬁrst step towards full-scale liberalization. Once import
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for imports and exports can easily be used to undermine the eﬀectiveness of capital controls (Eichengreen,
1996). We should therefore expect to ﬁnd that some of the eﬀects documented in the case of fully ﬂedged
liberalizations are already present when current account convertibility is introduced. A related question is if
measures to restrict capital ﬂows have the predicted negative consequences. In this paper, I use the
experience of Western Europe to examine the consequences of exchange and capital controls for the cost of
capital. Since rapid post-war growth in these countries has been used as evidence that ﬁnancial repression
can actually have positive eﬀects, it is a particularly interesting historical episode to examine (Wyplosz,
1999, 2000). Also, the more successful interventions carried out by these countries created large distortions,
both by the standards of the time and in a long-term perspective (Dooley and Isard, 1980). I employ event-
study methods to show that the introduction of current and capital account convertibility led to signiﬁcant
reductions in the cost of capital in post-war Western Europe. This paper then examines the eﬀect of a
growing number of capital controls that European countries enforced in the ﬁnal years of the Bretton
Woods System. These had considerable adverse eﬀects on the cost of equity ﬁnance.
I begin by describing the history of current and capital account liberalization in Europe between 1950
and 1995. Section 2 analyses the eﬀect of current account liberalization. Section 3 examines the
consequences of capital controls in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and Section 4 concludes.
1. LIBERALIZATION OF CAPITAL AND CURRENCY MOVEMENTS IN EUROPE, 1950–1995
The Bretton Woods accords promised a return to full currency convertibility within ﬁve years of the IMF’s
founding (Eichengreen, 1996). At the same time, the free movement of capital was not part of the initial
design. In the discussions leading up to the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, the British delegate, John
M. Keynes, argued strongly that international capital mobility should be severely curtailed as part of the
‘new ﬁnancial architecture’. With memories of the destabilizing inﬂuence that cross-border capital ﬂows
had had in the interwar years still fresh, he wrote: ‘Nothing is more certain than that the movement of
capital funds must be regulated...’.
8 The British view largely prevailed, and the IMF statutes granted each
member country the right to control capital movements as it saw ﬁt. In his closing address, the US Secretary
of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, hailed the success of the Bretton Woods conference in ‘driv[ing] ... the
usurious money lenders from the temple of international ﬁnance’.
9
After the disastrous experience with Britain’s 1947 attempt to make sterling convertible, even current
account liberalization was no longer on the agenda. The USA stopped pressing for progress amongst her
European allies. Nonetheless, reconstructing trading links was vital if Europe was to recover from the
consequences of WW2. Almost all European countries ran trade deﬁcits with the United States, as a result
of capital goods imports needed for reconstruction, thus creating what was known as the ‘dollar shortage’.
Also, trade within Europe was hampered by a lack of currency reserves, making it impossible for countries
to run temporary deﬁcits. After a number of largely unsuccessful schemes to resolve the impasse in inter-
European trade, the European Payments Union was introduced in 1950 (Eichengreen, 1993). This provided
for a system of multilateral netting arrangements, administered by the BIS in Basle, and allowed for the
provision of credit. Beyond a certain limit (initially set at 20% of 1949 trade volume), debts had to be
settled in either gold or dollars.
10 It proved largely successful in restoring trading links within Europe, and
in averting balance of payment crises when deﬁcits rose (Temin, 1995). There is also some evidence that it
helped to promote trade with non-EPU members (Eichengreen, 1993). The system was intended to operate
for no more than two years. In the end, it remained in place until 1958. It was not before January 1959 that
the majority of European countries returned to full currency convertibility, with countries like France
delaying by a few more months (Bakker, 1993).
Liberalization of trade under the EPU proceeded by reducing the number of goods for which
import licences were required. In the case of temporary imbalances, countries could halt or even
revoke liberalization. With a balance of payments crisis looming, Germany for example did so in
February 1951 (Kaplan and Schleiminger, 1989). Until the end, however, capital ﬂows were all but
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capital altogether.
11
Nonetheless, the available evidence suggests that monetary authorities retained a good deal of control
over capital ﬂows. Obstfeld documents that during the 1960s, deviations from covered interest parity
remained substantial. He ﬁnds an average diﬀerential of 2% for Britain and 1% for Germany.
12
Comparisons of on- and oﬀshore rates also indicate that capital controls remained eﬀective}Eurosterling
interest rates were on average 78 basis points higher than British rates, while Eurodeutschmark interest
rates were 40 bp lower (Marston, 1993). A wide range of instruments was available to governments trying
to isolate their economies from foreign capital ﬂows. These took three principal forms. First, administrative
controls can make all cross-border ﬂows illegal if they have not been authorized previously.
13 Second, states
can impose taxes on capital in- or outﬂows in a number of forms. In the early 1970s, for example, Germany
required banks to deposit a certain percentage of the increase in their foreign liabilities at zero interest with
the Bundesbank. This was combined with a cash reserve requirement (Bakker, 1993). Third, states can
operate dual or multiple exchange rate regimes. Current account transactions would be settled at one
exchange rate, and capital account transactions at another.
14 Belgium, France and Italy used dual market
mechanisms as a way of controlling capital ﬂows at diﬀerent times.
2. THE EFFECTS OF LIBERALIZATION
In the empirical part of this paper, we use two methods to analyse the consequences of liberalizations and
capital controls. Many studies that examine the eﬀect of stock market liberalizations on the cost of capital
have used event studies. We follow this approach here. Our results can thus easily be compared with those
from studies of recent liberalizations in the Third World. Event studies are not without diﬃculties, however.
Determining the relevant dates is no easy matter. Also, announcement eﬀects may be strong, resulting in a
stock market reaction prior to implementation that tends to obscure the true impact of interventions and
regulatory changes. These diﬃculties cannot be avoided altogether, even if careful examination of the
historical context and the use of alternative sets of dates can go some way towards addressing these issues.
15
We augment this approach by using a measure widely accepted as a good proxy for the eﬀectiveness of
capital controls}the spread between on- and oﬀshore interest.
16 There is substantial evidence that, the
longer capital controls are in place, the less eﬀective they become.
17 While indices of regulatory intervention
may be constant, eﬀective constraints on capital mobility may be withering away. This should be reﬂected
in the extent to which capital controls suceed in driving a ‘wedge’ between domestic and Euromarket
interest rates (Marston, 1995). There are three beneﬁts of replacing the dummy variables for capital and
current account convertibility with a continuous variable. First, it avoids issues of timing and the problem
of announcement dates versus implementation. Second, these variables oﬀer greater identifying variance.
Third, we are using a more meaningful direct measure of the extent to which controls aﬀected capital
mobility.
Under what conditions is integration into the world capital market beneﬁcial? Stulz (1999) shows that a




where s is the variance of excess returns in a small country and the world, and r is the correlation coeﬃcient
of returns on the small country portfolio and the world portfolio. If, as Edwards (1999) argues, the
abolition of controls increases stock market volatility, this condition needs to be recast. Let us assume that
volatility increases by a factor l, where l41. Then, if ss denotes the variance of returns in the small country




as long as there is no change in the riskless rate. Based on equation (2), we can calculate the critical value l*
above which the cost of equity capital in any one country would actually increase as a result of capital
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before and after current account liberalization.
18
Based on correlations in the post-integration phase and the variances in the pre-integration phase, we
calculate critical values for l. For all periods, the actual change in volatility l is considerably below l*.
This raises the question of how much}if any}of the increase in volatility can be attributed to increasing
market integration. To examine this issue more closely, we estimate a set of GARCH models in Appendix
A. These demonstrate clearly that current and capital account liberalizations did not contribute
signiﬁcantly to the volatility of equity returns. Note that these results are in line with the ﬁndings of
Bekaert and Harvey (2000) for the case of emerging markets.
To estimate the eﬀects of liberalization measures, we follow the basic set-up used by Henry (2000) and
estimate the following equation:
Rit ¼ ai þ g1 Liberalize þ bRUS
t þ g2 pit þ g3Iit þ eit
where Rit is the continuously compounded monthly real return in domestic currency in country i at time t,
R
US is the US stock market return, p is the monthly rate of inﬂation, and I is the change in the index of
monthly industrial production.
19 The use of a ﬁxed eﬀects model with country-speciﬁc intercepts is justiﬁed
by evidence that average long-run equity returns vary from country to country.
20 Liberalize is a dummy
variable set equal to 1 for the 12-month period centred on the implementation month (starting with the ﬁfth
month before implementation, and ending with the sixth month afterwards). If T* is the implementation
month, our event window extends from T* 5t oT*þ6, giving 12 months in all. Extending the period
during which the dummy is set to 1 so as to include the announcement date is common practice
(MacKinlay, 1997). Given that markets only began to operate again, we may also expect adjustment to take
some time, even after implementation. The sensitivity of our results with respect to the event window is
tested below.
21
Table 1. Descriptive statistics, monthly stock market returns
Germany France US Italy UK
1950:08–1958:12
mean 1.29% 0.65% 0.5% 0.85% –0.03%
std. dev. 4.20% 5.5% 2.9% 4.0% 4.5%
corr. with US 0.12 0.31 1 0.26 0.26
1959: 01–1972:12
mean 0.15% 0.00% 0.24%  0.17% 0.32%
std. dev. 4.2% 4.48% 3.23% 4.8% 3.8%
corr. with US 0.25 0.27 1 0.19 0.37
1973:01–1999:09
mean 0.32% 0.43% 0.32% 0.14% 0.09%
std. dev. 4.1% 6.9% 3.7% 6.5% 4.85%
corr. with US 0.31 0.41 1 0.35 0.58
Table 2. Changes in volatility
Period 1–Period 2 Period 2–Period 3
Germany France Italy UK Germany France Italy UK
ss 4.2% 5.5% 4.0% 4.5% 4.2% 4.48% 6.5% 3.8%
sw 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 3.2%
r 0.25 0.27 0.19 0.37 0.31 0.41 0.35 0.58
l* 5.79 7.02 7.26 4.19 4.19 3.38 4.25 2.03
l 1.00 0.81 1.2 0.84 0.98 1.54 1.35 1.28
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statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level (Table 3).
22 For the whole event window, we calculate cumulative
abnormal returns of between 23% and 34% as a result of the introduction of current account convertibility.
This is very similar to the eﬀects found by Henry (2000) in the case of direct stock market liberalizations
such as ADR listing and the introduction of country funds. He estimates monthly returns of 4.7% over a
period of eight months, giving a cumulative return of 38%. The signiﬁcance and magnitude of the
coeﬃcient on liberalization is not aﬀected if we control for US stock returns or for domestic economic
variables. Also, the choice of estimation technique appears to have no eﬀect. Whether we assume the
presence of cross-sectional heteroscedasticity (under generalized least squares) or of heteroscedasticity and
contemporaneous correlation (in the case of seemingly unrelated regressions), current account liberalization
appears to have a strong positive eﬀect on equity returns.
This is also true in every national subsample, with the exception of the United Kingdom (Table 4).
Results are always statistically signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The exceptions are Germany, where we ﬁnd 1%
Table 3. Panel regression: stock market reaction to current account convertibility
Estimation method: GLS SUR
Regression: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Liberalize 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.021*** 0.019**
(5.7) (5.0) (4.4) (3.2) (2.8) (2.6)
R
US 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37***
(4.6) (5.1) (4.1) (4.1)
p  0.29***  0.47*
(1.1) (1.7)
DI 0.01  0.007
(0.3) (0.2)
R
2 0.029 0.085 0.085 0.04 0.085 0.082
N 444 444 444 444 444 444
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1950:08 to 1960:01. Countries included are Italy, Germany, France and the UK. T-statistics (in brackets) are based on
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. The dependent variable is the continuously compounded monthly real
return of the national share price index (see Appendix B for details). Liberalize is a dummy variable for the introduction of current
account convertibility, set equal to 1 from T*  5t oT*þ6 (where T* is the implementation month for the introduction of currency
convertibility). R
US is the continuously compounded real return on the US stock market index (for details of data construction,
cf. Appendix B). Intercept and three country dummies included but not reported.
Table 4. Stock market reaction to current account convertibility
Germany France Italy GB
Regression: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Liberalize 0.031*** 0.028** 0.026* 0.028* 0.028* 0.028* 0.031** 0.024* 0.024* 0.02 0.014 0.01
(3.5) (2.12) (1.95) (1.73) (1.8) (1.82) (2.4) (1.9) (1.9) (1.43) (1.0) (0.8)
R
US 0.2 0.22 0.65*** 0.66*** 0.35** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37***
(1.32) (1.49) (3.8) (3.8) (2.4) (2.5) (2.4) (2.3)
p  0.88***  0.05 0.05**  0.52
(1.5) (0.1) (0.12) (0.9)
DI  0.07 0.32 0.038  0.045
(0.08) (1.45) (0.75) (0.6)
R
2 0.04 0.047 0.5 0.017 0.12 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.11 0.004 0.05 0.04
N 113 113 113 114 114 114 103 103 103 114 114 114
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1950:08 to 1960:01. Constant included but not reported. Dependent variable is the continuously compounded
monthly real return on the German stock market index. R
US is the continuously compounded real return on the US stock market, DI,
is the monthly rate of change of industrial production, and p is the consumer rice inﬂation. Estimation technique is OLS. For data
sources, cf. Appendix B.
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possible interactions with the US stock market and the inﬂuence of inﬂation and industrial production. In
Germany, France and Italy, for every month in the event window, we ﬁnd abnormal returns of 2.8% to 3%
in the simplest regression set-up. This implies cumulative abnormal returns of 34% to 36%. Once we
control for possible movements with foreign stock markets}taking the US market as a proxy}the returns
are somewhat smaller, but remain sizeable. Even if we account for the inﬂuence of other country-speciﬁc
variables such as inﬂation and the growth of industrial output, the cumulative abnormal returns are 29%
and 34%. The eﬀect in Britain was smaller, and the coeﬃcient is not statistically signiﬁcant at conventional
levels.
The case that looks strikingly diﬀerent is Britain}returns are positive and sizeable in the ‘naive’
regression speciﬁcation, but no signiﬁcant results emerge. Britain is diﬀerent from the other EPU members
in that it liberalized more gradually, with earlier steps towards greater convertibility. The most signiﬁcant
change came in March 1954, when the London gold market re-opened and the UK widened transferability
of sterling outside the dollar area (Kaplan and Schleiminger, 1989). Arguably, therefore, the UK was less
closed to outside capital in the ﬁnal stage of EPU than other member countries}and it reinforces our
conclusions that returns were not as high there as they were elsewhere. If this were true, the beneﬁts of
greater capital market integration must have accrued at some stage}and the change in March 1954 is the
obvious point in time to examine. Table 5 gives the results. Just as in the case of other liberalizations of the
current account, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant positive returns. The magnitude is somewhat smaller than that found
for other countries in 1958/59. The eﬀect is signiﬁcant in the baseline speciﬁcation, but for the alternative
regressions including macroeconomic controls, the liberalization dummy is only signiﬁcant at the 11% and
15% levels. Note also that the combined eﬀect of the liberalizations in Britain in 1954 and 1959 is
approximately equal to the eﬀect observed elsewhere.
Did trade liberalizations lead to higher stock market values simply because expected rates of growth
increased? The role of lowering barriers to exports and imports in Europe’s spectacular post-war boom has
often been emphasized. Our argument emphasizing the role of risk diversiﬁcation would then have to be
discarded. By controlling for macroeconomic variables in our regressions, we have already reduced the
likelihood of such an objection being true.
23 We test for this possibility by examining other liberalization
events during the period in question. EPU proceeded by extending the list of goods for which import and
export licences were no longer necessary. Gradual progress on this count was sometimes checked by
individual events}such as in February 1951, when Germany suspended liberalization, or in June 1957,
when France did the same (Kaplan and Schleiminger, 1989). In these crises, import controls were
Table 5. Britain’s liberalization in 1954
Estimation method: OLS
Regression: 1 2 3










2 0.05 0.04 0.01
N 54 54 54
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1950:08 to 1954:10. T-statistics (in brackets) are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and
covariances. The dependent variable is the continuously compounded real return of the monthly British share price index (see
Appendix B for details). Other variables as in Table 4. UKLIB is set to 1 from 1953:11 to 1954:10, 0 otherwise. Constant included but
not reported.
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liberalizations had eﬀects similar to the introduction of current account convertibility, we would expect
similar coeﬃcients.
In all speciﬁcations in Table 6, the coeﬃcient on other liberalizations is one order of magnitude smaller
than for the introduction of current account liberalizations. Also, t-statistics are never signiﬁcant. There is
no direct evidence to suggest that current account liberalization was just one of a series of trade
liberalizations that increased stock market values through an acceleration of growth. Our results are also
robust to changes in the length of the event window used. Table 7 gives the results if we shorten the window
length to eight months (Liberalize2), or three months (Liberalize3). The eﬀect of liberalization is robust for
Liberalize2; for Liberalize3, the t-statistic is somewhat below conventional levels. Only if we use SUR
Table 6. Panel regressions: stock market reaction to other trade liberalizations
Estimation method: GLS SUR
Regression: 1 2 3 4 5 6
OLIB 0.011 0.0077 0.006 0.0035 0.003 0.002
(1.5) (1.1) (0.93) (0.6) (0.4) (0.28)
R
US 0.4** 0.4** 0.41*** 0.41***
(5.4) (5.5) (4.5) (4.4)





2 0.009 0.06 0.07 0.004 0.06 0.06
N 444 444 444 444 444 444
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1950:08 to 1960:01. T-statistics (in brackets) are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and
covariances. The dependent variable is the continuously compounded real return of the monthly national share price index (see
Appendix B for details). Variables as in Table 4, except for OLIB}other trade liberalizations, ace. to Kapfan and Schleiminger (1989)
(value takes three values: 1 for liberalizations  1 for suspensions of liberalizations, and 0 for all other events). Event window from
T* 5t oT*þ6. We estimate with a ﬁxed intercept and three country dummies.
Table 7. Panel regressions: stock market reaction to current account convertibility
Estimation method: GLS SUR






US 0.4*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.41***
(5.4) (5.6) (4.4) (4.4)
p  0.35***  0.37  0.45***  0.46*
(1.4.2) (1.4) (1.9) (1.9)
DI 0.01 0.01 0.006 0.01
(0.03) (1.0) (0.2) (0.2)
R
2 0.07 0.065 0.07 0.07
N 444 444 444 444
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1950:08 to 1960:01. T-statistics (in brackets) are based on White heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and
covariances. The dependent variable is the continuously compounded real return of the monthly national share price index (see
Appendix B for details). Liberalize2 is a dummy variable for the introduction of current account convertibility, set equal to 1 from
T* 3t oT*þ4 (where T* is the implementation month for the introduction of currency convertibility; Liberalize3 is constructed
analogously, but for an event window from T* lt oT*þl. We estimate with a ﬁxed intercept and three country dummies.
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trustworthiness of our results, and is more likely to be the result of well-known shortcomings of the Parks
estimator (Beck and Katz, 1995).
The dummy variable method has the beneﬁt of controlling for possible changes in the regression
coeﬃcients during the event window. In contrast, estimating abnormal returns based on a forecasting
equation up to the beginning of the event may suﬀer from speciﬁcation errors (Binder, 1998). To
demonstrate the robustness of our results, we also plot CARs (cumulative abnormal returns) in Figure 1.
Table 8. Panel regression: stock market reaction to capital controls
Estimation method: GLS SUR
12 3 4 5 6
Spread  0.005***  0.004***  0.0037***  0.006***  0.0038***  0.0033***
(5.6) (4.5) (3.7) (5.5) (4.7) (3.6)
R
w 0.51*** 0.51*** 0.52*** 0.51***
(18.3) (17.2) (19.8) (18.9)




Int  0.0002  0.0003
(0.6) (0.8)
R
2 0.019 0.21 0.22 0.019 0.21 0.22
N 1470 1470 1341 1470 1470 1341
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1960:01 to 1998:01. Countries included are Germany, France, the UK and the USA. T- statistics (in brackets) are
based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. The dependent variable is the continuously compounded
monthly real return of the national share price index (see Appendix B for details). Spread is the absolute value of the diﬀerence between
the national interest rate and the Euromarket rate denominated in domestic currency. R
w is the continuously compounded real return
on the MSCI World Index. Intercept and three country dummies included but not reported. For data sources, cf. Appendix B.
Figure 1. Cumulative abnormal returns.
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convertibility, abnormal returns begin to accumulate; within six months of current account liberalization,
European stock indices rose by 15–45%.
3. THE COST OF CAPITAL CONTROLS
Increasing capital controls in the late 1960s and early 1970s oﬀer an additional opportunity to examine the
impact of intervention. We shall ﬁrst examine the eﬀects on stock returns in general, and then turn to the
most famous example}the case of Germany. The diﬀerence between domestic and Euromarket interest
rates is widely accepted as a good indicator of the eﬃcacy of capital controls (Marston, 1995). Even under
relatively weak conditions for market eﬃciency, interest rate diﬀerentials of more than a few basis points
should not persist, given that the maturity, default risk and currency risk of the instruments are almost
identical.
24 In contrast, most countries in our sample engineered spreads of up to 10 percentage points at
their peak, and succeeded in sustaining diﬀerentials of several percentage points for extended periods. The
instruments included, amongst others, taxes on capital movements, taxes to equalize interest rates (such as
the US interest equalization tax), compulsory minimum reserve requirements, and prohibitions to borrow
abroad (Battilossi, 2001; Bakker, 1993).
Table 9 demonstrates the eﬀects of diminishing capital market integration on stock returns. We ﬁnd a
consistent negative eﬀect of greater absolute spreads, indicating that the greater the artiﬁcial wedge between
domestic and international interest rates produced by intervention, the lower the stock returns.
25 The eﬀect
is sizeable. Marston (1995) calculates that the spread between onshore and oﬀshore rates in the UK
increased by 0.74% from the period 1961–71 to 1973–79, when capital controls were fully in force. Our
estimates suggest the intervention lowered stock returns by 0.24% to 0.44% per month (2.9% to 5.3% per
year).
26 Note that, since most countries in our sample chose to limit outﬂows, domestic interest rates were
held at artiﬁcially low levels. This in itself should have helped stocks}as the negative coeﬃcient on the
domestic interest rate variable in regressions 3 and 6 demonstrates.
Nonetheless, capital controls are often imposed at a time of economic crisis}and unusually low stock
market returns might well reﬂect deteriorating fundamentals rather than a genuine increase in the cost of
Table 9. Panel regression: stock market reaction to capital controls
Estimation method: GLS SUR
12 3 4
Spreadþ  0.002*  0.002  0.002*  0.002*
(1.68) (1.5) (1.8) (1.62)
R
w 0.8*** 0.82*** 0.79*** 0.82***
(28.5) (31.3) (26.5) (27.9)





2 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.16
N 374 365 374 374
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1960:01 to 1998:01. Countries included are Germany, France, the UK and the USA. T-statistics (in brackets) are
based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. The dependent variable is the continuously compounded
monthly real return of the national share price index (see Appendix B for details). Spreadþ is the absolute value of the diﬀerence
between the national interest rate and the Euromarket rate denominated in domestic currency for months when industrial production
did not decline. R
w is the continuously compounded real return on the MSCI World Index. Intercept and three country dummies
included but not reported. For data sources, cf. Appendix B.
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exchange rate by other means. Reserves were often running low, industrial exports had become
uncompetitive, and capital was ﬂeeing the country, possibly to proﬁt from a devaluation that was becoming
increasingly likely. The repeated British crises follow such a pattern. By limiting capital outﬂows, countries
are eﬀectively ‘buying time’ and allowing the economy to recover by keeping interest rates lower than they
would otherwise have been. It is not diﬃcult to see why, under conditions such as these, stock returns might
be unusually low}and severing the link with the world capital market may not be a cause of the negative
coeﬃcient that we ﬁnd in Table 9. Controlling for industrial output growth and inﬂation should go some
way towards addressing concerns that the spreads widened during periods of unusually disappointing
macroeconomic performance. We ﬁnd no evidence that the coeﬃcient on Spread becomes insigniﬁcant,
even if its size drops somewhat.
To examine this issue further, we use three alternative tests. First, we examine the impact of the spread
variable only for those periods with favourable economic conditions. Second, we use dividend yields as a
dependent variable. Third, we focus more closely on one usual case of capital controls}Germany. If the
eﬀect documented in Table 9 is spurious because capital controls are simply indicative of economic crisis,
we should expect to ﬁnd insigniﬁcant or even positive coeﬃcients during periods when overall economic
performance was favourable. As a simple test, we examine the subset of months during which industrial
production rose, and test for the impact of higher spreads. The results in Table 10 suggest that higher
spreads had a negative eﬀect on stock market valuations, even if industrial production rose in the same
month. This is true in all speciﬁcations, and independent of the range of control variables used}except for
speciﬁcation 2, where the t-statistic is marginally below customary levels of signiﬁcance. Weaking the link
with the world capital market had signiﬁcant costs, even in good times.
Spreads are known to widen in response to speculative pressure against a currency. If attacks by
speculators are indicative of a wider economic crisis, we would also expect a negative correlation between
them and equity returns.
27 To reduce the danger that our results are driven by the negative consequences of
foreign exchange speculation, we regress spreads on the attack variable as calculated by Eichengreen et al.
(1996). The residuals of this regression provide a measure of the degree of capital market separation that is
not driven by acute pressures on a currency. In Table 10, we use these residuals as an explanatory variable.
Table 10. Panel regression: stock market reaction to capital controls, net of speculative attacks
Estimation method: GLS SUR
1 2 34 56
SpreadR  0.0063***  0.0048***  0.004***  0.006***  0.0048***  0.004**
(4.3) (3.6) (3.1) (4.4) (3.7) (3.1)
R
w 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.48***
(12.8) (11.9) (14.0) (13.6)




Int  0.0007 0.0008
(1.5) (1.45)
R
2 0.019 0.22 0.22 0.008 0.19 0.19
N 908 908 908 908 908 908
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1967:01 to 1998:01. Countries included are Germany, France, the UK and the USA. T-statistics (in brackets) are
based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. The dependent variable is the continuously compounded
monthly real return of the national share price index (see Appendix B for details). SpreadR is the absolute value of the residuals of a
GLS regression of spreads on the speculative attack variable, as deﬁned by Eichengreen et al. (1996). The data is available at http://
haas.berkeley.edu/ arose/RecRes.htm. The start date for their variable is January 1967. R
w is the continuously compounded real
return on the MSCI World Index. Intercept and three country dummies included but not reported. For data sources, cf. Appendix B.
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and international markets widens}even during non-crises. The coeﬃcients on the spread variable are only
marginally smaller than in the initial set-up, and remain signiﬁcant at the 5% level throughout.
Our second test uses dividend yields}available from the 1960s}as a dependent variable. If higher
spreads simply coincided with economic downturns, we would expect dividends to fall as well. If this
alternative interpretation is correct, the coeﬃcient on the spread variable should be negative}higher
spreads should coincide with lower dividend yields, as earnings collapse. If, on the other hand, the
coeﬃcient is positive, then higher spreads principally coincide with higher costs of capital.
As Table 11 demonstrates, larger spreads are systematically associated with higher dividend
yields}again suggesting that the cost of capital is higher when the free ﬂow of capital is hindered. This
ﬁnding is particularly useful in reinforcing our earlier ﬁndings, as there is good reason to believe that
dividend yields are more eﬀective indicators of the cost of capital than excess returns (Bekaert and Harvey,
2000). In our baseline regressions, we used the absolute value of the spread in any given country at time t as
an indicator of capital market integration. The underlying assumption was that deviations from zero had
symmetric implications for risk diversiﬁcation, and hence, the shadow equity premium. However, it could
be argued that one should expect very diﬀerent implications from positive and negative spreads}whether
authorities tried to engineer lower or higher domestic rates might be seen as an indicator of economic
conﬁdence, for example. Table 12 estimates the eﬀect of spreads separately for positive and negative values,
and then tests for the equality of the coeﬃcients. The magnitudes are very similar throughout. Using the
Wald F-test for coeﬃcient restrictions, we ﬁnd that we can never reject the null that the coeﬃcient on
PSpread is equal to }NSpread. There is therefore no reason to believe that stock markets reacted
asymmetrically to diﬀerent kinds of ‘sand in the wheels’}the absolute value of spreads, measuring the
extent to which capital markets were kept apart from the world market, determined the cost of equity
ﬁnance.
The third test of the hypothesis examines the case of Germany more closely. To avoid rapid appreciation
of the currency as a result of increasing doubts about the dollar, the country introduced a whole host of
measures designed to avoid capital inﬂows (Dooley and Isard, 1980). While in force, they proved unusually
eﬀective, driving domestic rates higher than the Euromarket rate by an average of almost 3% (Marston,
1993). The German episode is useful in that it reduces the likelihood of reverse causation. Economic
Table 11. Panel regression: dividend yields and capital controls
Estimation method: GLS SUR
12345 6
Spread 0.24*** 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.18*** 0.185*** 0.099***
(6.3) (8.4) (4.6) (8.5) (11.3) (5.7)
DY
US 0.99** 0.85*** 0.98*** 0.84***
(49.1) (33.7) (38.2) (27.1)
p 26.7*** 24.5***
(5.2) (4.99)





2 0.22 0.68 0.67 0.21 0.68 0.66
N 421 421 369 421 369 369
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1960:01 to 1998:01. Countries included are Germany, France, the UK and the USA. T-statistics (in brackets) are
based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. The dependent variable is the average dividend yield of shares
contained in the national share price index (see Appendix B for details). Spread is the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the
national interest rate and the Euromarket rate denominated in domestic currency. DY
US is the dividend yield for S&P 500. Intercept
and three country dummies included but not reported. For data sources, cf. Appendix B.
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was notable for being unusually powerful and sustained. Investors the world over were trying to put money
into Germany, and interest rates were raised to higher levels than would have prevailed under full capital
mobility. The only fear that motivated the German authorities was one of massive capital inﬂows (Bakker,
1993).
28
The two main policy instruments used by the Bundesbank were the Bardepot (cash deposit) and the
Mindestreserve (minimum reserve). The Bardepot required banks to deposit 40% of their liabilities incurred
vis-" a a-vis non-residents with the Bundesbank (from March 1972). This was raised to 50% by July 1972,
before being reduced to 20% in February 1974. The Bardepot provision was ﬁnally abolished in September
1974. The minimum reserve requirement was a special reserve ratio on the growth of banks’ liabilities to
non-residents. Table 13 repeats our earlier analysis for Germany, using Mindestreserve and Bardepot as
explanatory variables. While the coeﬃcient on minimum reserve requirements is consistently signiﬁcant and
negative, Bardepot only has a signiﬁcant eﬀect at customary levels when we do not control for co-movement
with foreign markets or domestic conditions. This suggests that the former was more eﬀective in controlling
capital ﬂows.
29 The eﬀect is not small}the estimated coeﬃcients suggest that, at its peak July 1972 to
January 1974, the combined eﬀects of the Mindestreserve and the Bardepot reduced returns by 1.4% to
2.3% real per month. To further examine the impact of capital controls, we use two alternative measures.
First, we employ the dummy technique applied by Dooley and Isard (1980), who construct a variable rising
in ﬁve discrete steps from 0 to 5 to measure the stringency of capital controls. Second, we use the diﬀerence
between domestic and Euromarket interest rates as a proxy for the eﬀectiveness of capital controls.
Table 14 gives the results. Dooley’s and Isard’s stepwise measure shows a clear negative impact on stock
returns. At the height of intervention, it shaved an average of up to 2.5% oﬀ equity returns. Note that the
impact is stable across speciﬁcations, including those that include the US market return and German
industrial production. The only exception is when we add inﬂation directly, which is highly collinear with
the intervention variables}concern about the need to ﬁght inﬂationary tendencies motivated the
intervention in the ﬁrst place.
30 Note that the intervention variable is once again estimated with small
Table 12. Panel regression: stock market reaction to capital controls, positive and negative spreads estimated separately
Estimation method: GLS
1 234 5 6
PSpread  0.006**  0.0036***  0.0031**
(3.34) (2.4) (2.05)
NSpread 0.0049*** 0.0044*** 0.0038**
(3.3) (3.0) (2.51)
R
w 0.54*** 0.37** 0.53** 0.37***
(13.5) (4.2) (12.6) (3.89)




Int  0.0008  0.0002
(1.3) (0.32)
F-test that NSpread¼ PSpread 0.38 0.27 0.24
R
2 0.034 0.018 0.25 0.16 0.25 0.16
N 636 320 636 320 636 320
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1963:01 to 1990:12. Countries included are Germany, France, the UK and the USA. T-statistics (in brackets) are
based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. The dependent variable is the continuously compounded
monthly real return of the national share price index (see Appendix B for details). PSpread is the value of Spread if Spread is larger than
or equal to zero. Nspread is equal to the value of Spread if Spread is smaller than zero. R
w is the continuously compounded real return
on the MSCI World Index. Intercept and three country dummies included but not reported. For data sources. Continuously
compounded monthly real return of cf. Appendix B.
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the spread between oﬀshore and onshore rates as an indicator of capital ﬂow restrictions. The spread
variable is constructed as the diﬀerence between three-month domestic interest rates and the three-month
Euromarket rate. In April 1970, at the time when the minimum reserve requirement was introduced, the
domestic three-month rate was a mere 11 bp higher than the oﬀshore rate. Between April 1970 and
September 1974, when the last provisions were abolished, it averaged 264 bp. For every increase in the
spread by 100 bp, we estimate a reduction in monthly equity returns of 0.3%. For the period as a whole, the
cumulative impact of capital controls was 36.4% to 46.2%. The German case, combined with the evidence
Table 13. Stock market reaction to restrictions of capital ﬂows}Germany
12 3 4 56
Bardepot  0.000395**  0.0003*  0.0002
(2.1) (1.65) (1.14)
Mindestreserve  0.00035**  0.00029**  0.00023*
(2.5) (2.1) (1.64)
R
US 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.32***
(9.5) (6.2) (6.5) (6.2)
p  0.71***  0.68***
(2.1) (2.0)
DI  0.03  0.032
(0.5) (0.5)
R
2 0.0075 0.07 0.09 0.011 0.08 0.09
N 591 591 591 591 591 591
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1950:08 to 1999:09. Dependent variable is the continuously compounded monthly real return on the German stock
market index. Bardepot is the percentage of liabilities incurred with non-residents that banks have to deposit with the Bundesbank;
Mindestreserve is the percentage of the special reserve ration on the growth of liabilities with non-residents. Estimation method is OLS.
Table 14. Stock market reaction to restrictions of capital ﬂows
1 2 345 6 7 8 91 0
Step  0.005**  0.004*  0.004*  0.0027  0.004**
(2.4) (1.9) (1.9) (1.4) (1.9)
Spread  0.0038**  0.0034**  0.003**  0.0029*  0.003*
(2.5) (2.3) (2.3) (1.88) (2.1)
R
US 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.32** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.33***
(6.5) (6.5) (6.2) (6.3) (6.3) (0.05) (6.0) (6.2)
DI 0.041 0.03  0.04 0.19** 0.21* 0.21**
(0.69) (0.51) (0.68) (1.99) (2.0) (2.0)
p  0.69**  0.3
(2.1) (0.6)
p( 1) 0.12 0.08
(0.4) (0.18)
R
2 0.0098 0.076 0.077 0.09 0.08 0.015 0.1 0.11 0.12 0.12
N 587 587 587 587 587 419 419 419 419 419
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1950:08 to 1999:09 for regressions l to 5, 1963:01 to 1998:01 for regressions 6 to 10. Constant included but not
reported. Dependent variable is the continuously compounded monthly real return on the German stock market index. Step is the
index of capital account restrictions constructed by Dooley and Isard (1980). Spread is the absolute value of the diﬀerence between
domestic and the Eurodeutschmark 3-month interest rate. R
US is the continuously compounded real return on the US stock market, DI
is the monthly rate of change of industrial production, and p is the consumer price inﬂation. Estimation technique is OLS. For data
sources, cf. Appendix B.
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suggests that reverse causation was not at work.
Is the result speciﬁc to our measure of capital market integration? We use spreads because there are good
theoretical reasons to accept them as a measure of deviations from full capital market integration, and
because they are available on a monthly basis for much of the period under consideration. An alternative
indicator that has gained wide currency recently is based on a more ﬁnely calibrated indicator based on
assessments in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions (Quinn, 1997; Quinn and Inclan, 1997).
The Quinn index has the disadvantage of only being available on an annual basis. Nonetheless, if our
argument concerning the consequences of capital market liberalization is correct, we should expect to ﬁnd
similar eﬀects.
Table 15 presents the results for re-estimating the analysis in Table 11, using the Quinn index as an
explanatory variable.
31 Higher scores indicate a more liberalized capital account, on a scale from 0 to 4.
Greater capital market integration should lower the dividend yield}and this is exactly what Table 15
demonstrates. Going from a fully closed (Quinn score¼0) to a fully liberalized capital account would, all
else being equal, reduce dividend yields by between 1.32% and 2.44%}a very considerable reduction.
32
Did weaking the link with the world capital market have any real eﬀects? We already controlled for any
possible interaction between lower output growth and stock returns in our earlier regressions. Table 16
examines this issue further, using the growth of ppp-adjusted per capita income over seven separate
ﬁve-year periods as a dependent variable. We use the same data set as Wyplosz (2000), who argues that
capital controls and ﬁnancial repression may have had positive eﬀects on growth. We add the spread
variable as an indicator of the eﬀectiveness of capital controls to Wyplosz’s set-up. The correlation
coeﬃcient between the spread variable and the capital control dummy is a mere 0.46 in our sample. This
strongly suggests that simply using qualitative, dichotomous variables fails to capture suﬃciently the
considerable variation in the eﬀectiveness of implementation. In the case of Germany, for example, the
Wyplosz dummy suggests that capital controls in the 1960s were just as stringent as they were in the early
1970s}while average spreads were around 0.4% in the ﬁrst period, and closer to 2.4% in the early 1970s.
Since spreads are not available for all countries in the data set, we ﬁrst need to demonstrate that our
restricted sample shows similar behaviour to the one Wyplosz found. Regression 1 shows a positive,
signiﬁcant and moderately large coeﬃcient on capital controls}just as Wyplosz argued. The insigniﬁcant
Table 15. Panel regression: dividend yields and capital controls
Estimation method: GLS SUR
1234 5 6
Quinn  0.33*  0.37***  0.61*  0.47***  0.5***  0.58**
(2.04) (2.8) (2.4) (3.7) (4.5) (2.1)
DY
US 0.64*** 0.8*** 0.58*** 0.82***
(4.9) (7.4) (6.2) (5.4)
p 3.4 4.3 5.33*** 5.8*
(0.9) (0.86) (3.1) (1.65)





2 0.03 0.14 0.28 0.02 0.23 0.3
N 156 153 87 156 153 87
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1950 to 1989. Countries included are Germany, France, Italy and the UK. T-statistics (in brackets) are based on
heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. The dependent variable is the average dividend yield of shares contained
in the national share price index (see Appendix B for details). Quinn is the value of the capital account liberalization index as calculated
by Quinn (1997) DY
US is the dividend yield for the S&P 500.
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moving to a somewhat smaller data set. If the spread variable is large and statistically signiﬁcant (or if the
capital controls variable now becomes insigniﬁcant or even negative), we have also found further support
for the argument that slowing cross-border capital ﬂows is; harmful in its own right.
33
The eﬀect of the spread variable is consistently negative, and remains signiﬁcant in all speciﬁcations
except 6, where it is marginally below conventional signiﬁcance levels. The eﬀect is also large. The German
controls in the early 1970, for example, added 4.3% to the spread variable compared to the period of mild
controls thereafter, and lasted for 18 months (Marston, 1995). According to our estimates, they reduced
growth by 1.3% to 2.6% cumulatively, in addition to the negative eﬀect that they had through higher
interest rates. In equations 3 and 6, where we have combined the spread variable and the capital controls
variable, we ﬁnd that the dummy indicator used by Wyplosz actually becomes negative}even signiﬁcantly
so in the case of equation 6. If a commonly accepted measure of capital market integration such as the
spread of oﬀshore versus onshore instruments is used, there is a clear and unambiguous negative eﬀect of
capital controls on growth.
34
In countries such as Germany, where capital controls kept domestic interest rates artiﬁcially high, the
cost of equity increased even further by a higher equity premium. Where rates were kept lower, however, an
abolition of controls would have had a mixed impact. Note, however, that a substantial literature argues
that capital controls are a negative signal, and that the ‘irreversibility’ of inﬂows makes them less likely
under a control regime (Bartolini and Drazen, 1997a,b). Interest rates therefore need not necessarily rise
with the abolition of controls on outﬂows. However, if they do, the advantages of a lower equity premium
would be reduced by higher interest rates. Would the ﬁrst eﬀect have been suﬃcient to outweigh the latter?
Table 16. Panel regression: GDP growth 1960–95 and capital controls
Estimation method: Common intercept Fixed eﬀects
Regression: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Initial GDP  0.033***  0.03**  0.03*  0.045  0.03*  0.14***
p.c. (3.7) (3.7) (1.7) (1.58) (1.7) (4.3)
Spread  0.004***  0.003*  0.005***  0.002
(2.9) (1.7) (3.9) (1.5)
Capital 0.007*  0.006  0.5  0.007**
controls (1.7) (1.3) (0.5) (2.06)
Credit 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.0007
restraints (1.6) (0.99) (0.3) (0.77) (1.3) (0.16)
Inﬂation  0.003***  0.001**  0.001***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***
(3.3) (2.4) (3.1) (3.1) (5.1) (4.2)
Openness  0.004  0.004 0.002  0.02  0.1  0.03
(0.5) (0.37) (0.2) (0.2) (1.6) (0.6)
Size of 0.015* 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.02  0.07***
government (1.8) (1.5) (0.4) (0.97) (1.1) (3.7)
Higher  0.04  0.05  0.01  0.13  0.16*** 0.13**
education (1.1) (1.4) (0.24) (1.5) (4.3) (2.01)
Fertility 0.0008  0.001 0.04  0.048**  0.05***  0.07**
(0.07) (0.1) (1.3) (2.3) (2.98) (3.3)
R
2 0.62 0.64 0.84 0.72 0.73 0.95
N 32 32 32 32 32 32
Note: *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1960–95, ﬁve-year subperiods used (1960–64, 1965–69, 1970–74, 1975–79, 1980–84, 1985–89, I990–95). Estimation
method is GLS throughout. Countries included are Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Germany, France and the UK.
T-statistics (in brackets) are based on heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariances. The dependent variable is average
growth of ppp-adjusted GDP per capita. All variables except spread as in Wyplosz (1999). Period dummies included in regressions 3
and 6.
H.-J. VOTH 270










f is the risk-free rate in the world, and R
f;pre
i the pre-liberalization risk-free rate, T is the equity
premium, s is the variance of returns, and ri,w is the correlation of returns in country i with the returns in





i Þ)Tsi½si   ri;wsw  4Rf
w   R
f;pre
i
If risk-free rates rose, any given increase in equity values suggests an even greater reduction in the equity
premium. Stulz (1999) calculates that an increase in equity values by 30% suggests, under plausible
assumptions, a fall in the cost of equity by 3.5%. For the 23–34% change that we found following the
abolition of currency controls, this implies a reduction in the net cost of capital by 2.8% to 3.8%. Note,
however, that this is before any further beneﬁts from revoking capital controls. Regressing interest rates on
the Quin index with country-speciﬁc intercepts suggests that, by going from a fully closed to a fully open
capital account, countries would have had to accept interest rates that are 16% higher.
35 Therefore, for a
wide range of leverage ratios, the weighted average cost of capital should fall}even if access to capital was
not rationed under the controls regime, which in practice it almost always was (Bakker, 1993; Wyplosz,
1999).
36 The alternative approach to examining the net change in the cost of capital is to compare dividend
yields (Bekaert and Harvey, 2000; Stulz, 1999). Here, we ﬁnd net changes of  1.3% to  2.4% which
already take account of any possible impact of potentially higher risk-free rates.
4. CONCLUSIONS
There are good theoretical reasons to believe capital and current account convertibility should be
economically beneﬁcial. However, until recently, empirical evidence to support such a view has been scarce.
It is only as a result of studies by Quinn (1997), Arteta et al. (2001) and Edwards (2001) that more evidence
in favour of a clear link between liberalization and growth has begun to accumulate. This paper attempts to
contribute to the literature by examining the impact of liberalizations on the cost of capital in Western
Europe, 1950–1999, and to document the channel through which liberalization had benign eﬀects.
Along with other authors (Edwards, 2001), we ﬁnd that the inability of earlier studies to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
eﬀect of capital controls on most economic performance variables was caused by the use of simple
dichotomous variables as indicators for capital controls. Second, earlier studies have largely ignored the
cost of capital, instead focusing on other variables that are possibly only aﬀected indirectly. We resolve
these issues by examining two indicators of the cost of capital}dividend yields and excess returns, and by
using a widely accepted indicator of the extent to which controls ‘bite’}the diﬀerential between on- and
oﬀshore interest rates. We also document the value of this indicator for the eﬀectiveness of capital controls
by showing that the Quin index of capital account liberalization yields broadly similar results.
There is strong evidence to suggest that controls raised the cost of equity ﬁnance in post-war Europe
signiﬁcantly. We conduct a number of tests to rule out alternative causes, such as the benign eﬀects of trade
liberalization in the case of the end of EPU, and reverse causation in the case of spreads. Two historical
episodes support this conclusion}the late 1950s when most European countries switched to currency
convertibility, and the 1960s and 1970s, when many countries resorted to capital controls. This is important
for two reasons. First, it suggests that many of the beneﬁts of international diversiﬁcation are de facto
already achieved once currencies become convertible. Overcoming direct capital controls through over- and
under-invoicing becomes possible, and the sizeable gains in local market indices strongly suggest that
integration with the world stock market increases markedly as a result. Second, our results also cast light on
the historical debate about the costs and beneﬁts of the European Payments Union (Eichengreen, 1993).
The EPU was meant to last for two years, and existed for almost nine. More than 14 years passed between
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negative consequences used to be almost completely neglected. However, even the more critical recent
account of the EPU has found few drawbacks.
37 By delaying the introduction of full convertibility for a
number of years, EPU also had negative consequences}the beneﬁt of a lower cost of capital arrived later
than it would have done had it not been for the multilateral netting arrangement.
The introduction of capital controls by a number of European countries in the ﬁnal days of the Bretton
Woods System also oﬀers a natural experiment in the consequences of erecting barriers to the free ﬂow of
capital across borders. Our results show that, where such measures succeed, there are signiﬁcant negative
consequences for the cost of capital. This is true independent of the underlying economic performance and
of the direction in which capital is prevented from ﬂowing}the eﬀects in the German case, where inﬂows
were prevented, were as harmful as they were in the UK, France and the USA, where outﬂows were
controlled.
Also, the fact that controls remained in place for extended periods, such as in France and the UK, may
have done substantial harm}especially during periods when the case for controls was doubtful. France, as
Sicsic and Wyplosz (1996) noted, ‘displays a mostly unexciting story’ in terms of the current account, noting
that it never experienced serious external imbalances after 1967. The fact that successive governments
nonetheless maintained controls until the early 1990s strongly suggests policy failure. Changes in dividend
yields during liberalizations also demonstrate that the claimed beneﬁts of lower interest rates were not
suﬃcient to oﬀset the disadvantages of reduced risk-sharing. Model calculations strongly suggest that the
positive eﬀects from capital and current account liberalizations were large enough to lower the net cost of
capital, even if higher governments had previously kept interest rates artiﬁcially low. The harm caused by
capital controls cannot be assessed when the focus is on short-run phenomena such as turmoil in the
currency market. Instead, the long-run impact on key economic variables such as the cost of equity needs to
be assessed. These can be substantial, as the results presented in this article demonstrate.
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APPENDIX A
Did liberalization cause higher volatility of equity returns? We use GARCH models to address this question
(Campbell et al., 1997). This involves the joint estimation of two equations}a mean equation and a
variance equation:
yt ¼ xtg þ et
s2 ¼ o þ ae2
t 1 þ bs2
t 1 ð3Þ
The ﬁrst equation relates the returns on an asset y to a set of explanatory variables x. The second
equation ﬁts a model to the forecast (conditional) variance of asset returns. o, a, g and b are parameters, s
2
is the variance, and e the error in the returns equation. Predictions of future volatility in this model are
based on the long-term average value o, the size of the unpredicted return in the last period, as well as the
conditional volatility in the last period. The adjustment parameter a measures the speed with which the
conditional variance of the inﬂation forecast changes as a result of an unexpected change in asset returns,
and b measures the extent to which a shock to conditional volatility persists.
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the variance equation, we use the dummy variable for current account liberalization as a regressor. There is
no evidence that the high returns immediately before current account liberalization and afterwards were
bought at the cost of higher volatility. While there is evidence of GARCH in all countries except the UK,
the coeﬃcient on Liberalize is never signiﬁcant, and in half of all cases, estimated with the wrong sign
(Table A.1).
APPENDIX B: SOURCES
Nominal stock price indices
France: International Financial Statistics, collected by hand before January 1957, IFS-CD ROM
thereafter.
Italy: International Financial Statistics, collected by hand before January 1957, IFS-CD ROM
thereafter.
Germany: Gielen (l994), pp. 181ﬀ, column A.
UK: International Financial Statistics, collected by hand before December 1957, IFS-CD ROM
thereafter.
USA: Standard and Poor’s Long Term Security Price Index Record (NBER Macrohistory Database
Series 11025) until January 1957, and from IFS-CD ROM thereafter.
World: MSCI World Index for 18 countries (dollar basis), provided by Global Financial Data
( CIWL UD.csv).
CPI indices
France: International Financial Statistics, collected by hand before January 1960, IFS-CD ROM
thereafter.
Italy: International Financial Statistics, collected by hand before January 1960, IFS-CD ROM
thereafter.
Germany: Gielen (l994), pp. 181ﬀ, column I.
UK: International Financial Statistics, collected by hand before December 1960, IFS-CD ROM
thereafter.
USA: US CPI index, provided by Global Financial Data (CPUSAM.csv).
Industrial production
France: International Financial Statistics, collected by hand before January 1957, IFS-CD ROM
thereafter.
Table A.1. GARCH models: stock market volatility and current account convertibility
Germany France Italy UK
Regression: 1 2 3 4
Liberalize 0.0004 0.00017  0.000134  0.0005
(0.4) (0.23) (0.42) (1.3)
a 0.3*** 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.13
(6.4) (3.3) (3.3)
b 0.4*** 0.52*** 0.71*** 0.4
(3.9) (3.5) (7.9) (1.2)
R
2 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.26
N 587 587 587 587
Note: *,**,*** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Sample period is 1950:08 to 1999:09. Z-statistics in brackets. In the return equations (not reported), the dependent variable is the
continuously compounded monthly real return of the national share price index (see Appendix A for details). Estimation is by
maximum likelihood.
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thereafter.
Germany: International Financial Statistics, collected by hand before December 1957, IFS-CD ROM
thereafter.
UK: International Financial Statistics, collected by hand before December 1957, IFS-CD ROM
thereafter.
USA: International Financial Statistics, collected by hand before January 1957, IFS-CD ROM
thereafter.
Domestic interest rates
France: 3 month Paris interbank oﬀer rate (Pibor), from OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Italy: 3 month interbank rate, from OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Germany: 3 month Frankfurt interbank oﬀer rate (Fibor), from OECD Main Economic Indicators.
UK: yield on treasury bills, from OECD Statistical Compendium (series 26M3).
USA: yield on treasury bills, 3 months, from OECD Statistical Compendium
Oﬀshore rates
France: 3 month FF deposit rate in London, from OECD Statistical Compendium (series 00EA6).
Germany: 3 month DM deposit rate in London, from OECD Statistical Compendium (series 00EA4).
UK: 3 month sterling deposit rate in Paris, from OECD Statistical Compendium (series 00EA2).
USA: 3 month dollar deposit rate in London, from OECD Statistical Compendium (series 00EA1).
Dividend yields
France: stocks dividend yield, provided by Global Financial Data (syfraym.csv).
Germany: MSCI dividend yield index, provided by Global Financial Data (sydeumym.csv).
UK: UK FT-Actuaries dividend yield, provided by Global Financial Data ( dftasd.csv).
USA: S&P 500 monthly dividend yield, provided by Global Financial Data (syusaym.csv).
NOTES
1. In 1989, the newly appointed ﬁnance ministe of Germany, Oscar Lafontaine, argued that the USA, Europe and Japan should aim
for a return to the Bretton Woods System. The Economist, 1998.
2. A similar result is reported by Alesina et al. (1994).
3. They use two measures of integration, deviations from the ICAPM and from the APT. Cf. Levine and Zervos (1998b).
4. For an overview, cf. Atiyas et al. (1994).
5. Edwards, However, ﬁnds a signiﬁcant reduction in stock market volatility as a result of capital controls (Edwards, 1999).
6. Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Blair (2000).
7. Their results hinge on time-shifted diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences analysis, assuming that Malaysia was at the same stage of the cycle in




11. Eichengreen (1996). There is ample evidence that such a mechanism was at work in Argentina between 1981 and 1990: Kamin
(1991).
12. Obstfeld (1993).
13. For example, many European countries maintained a system under which all foreign transactions, were prohibited unless they had
been expressly allowed. Only gradually did they adopt a ‘positive’ system that allowed all transfers unless forbidden. Cf. Bakker
(1993).
14. Countries also experimented with speciﬁc currency markets}purchases of foreign securities by residents could only be performed
if there was a matching purchase of domestic assets by foreigners. Ireland, the Netherlands, France and the UK used these
mechanisms for extended periods (Bakker, 1993).
15. Cf. the careful analysis of alternative dates and speciﬁcations in Blair (2000), Bekaert and Harvey (2000).
16. Marston (1993), Obstfeld (1993).
17. Gros (1987), Browne and McNelis (1990).
18. Recent research suggests that correlations have increased dramatically in the 1990s. Cf. Brooks and Catao (2000).
19. Note that simulation studies suggest that eﬀects are more diﬃcult to pick up using returns than dividend yields. Since dividend
data for our period is scarce, we choose to use returns, thus biasing our results against our hypothesis of a signiﬁcnat eﬀect. We
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Copyright # 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Int. J. Fin. Econ. 8: 255–276 (2003)also tested the sensitivity of our ﬁndings if we use an alernative index of global sstock returns (such as the MSCI World Index for
18 countries}cf. Appendix B). We ﬁnd fundamentally unchaged, large and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects of capital account
liberalization, and somewhat larger coeﬃcients for the return on the world index. This should not be surprising}the countries
used in our study are also all represented in the MSCI World Index, thus biasing correlations upwards. Because of this diﬃculty,
we decided to use US returns instead. Results are available from the author upon request.
20. Jorion and Goetzmann (1999).
21. Table 7 gives the results, which are largely unchanged.
22. There is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the results with ﬁxed eﬀects or with a common intercept. Results are available from the
author upon request.
23. Typically, we would use dividend yields to control for changes in proﬁtability. However, since the hypothesized eﬀect is said to
work through expected changes in proﬁtability, this may not be suﬃcient. More importantly, data on dividend yields is scarce
before 1960.
24. Cf. also Dooley and Isard (1980), Marston (1993).
25. The reason for using the absolute value of the diﬀerence in interest rates is that we are trying to simply measure the extent to which
the authorities succeeded in diriving a wedge between the domestic and the international capital market. Since in Germany, the
attempts to limit inﬂows resulted in domestic rates that were higher than for Euro-DM, we need to use absolute values.
26. This is in line with the ﬁndings by Levine and Zervos (1998a).
27. I am grateful to Charles Wyplosz for this point.
28. As is well known, inﬂation tends to have a negative eﬀect on stock returns (Fama and Schwert, 1977). However, since we already
control for inﬂation separately, this is unlikely to drive the results in Tables 13 and 14. Note also that countries facing deﬂationary
pressures under ﬁxed exchange rates}such as the majority of countries in our sample}show the same eﬀect.
29. Note that Marston (1993) found that the Bardepot provisions were more signiﬁcant than other restrictions.
30. Dooley and Isaard (1980), Bakker (1993).
31. I also experimented with using the excess returns as a dependent variable. However, since the noise to signal ratio is lower than for
dividend yields, and because only annual data is available, the eﬀect was inconsistently estimated and/or insigniﬁcant.
32. These eﬀects appear particularly large compared to the size of the eﬀects found by Bekaert and Harvey (2000).
33. Note that we are not attempting to provide a full model of industrial output growth. Rather, our model is in the spirit of
Bittlingmayer (1998).
34. The impact of revoking exchange controls in 1959 is harder to trace. Evidence at the country level suggests that TFP growth
accelerated after 1958 (Sicsic and Wyplosz, 1996).
35. The coeﬃcient on the Quinn index varies considerably by speciﬁcation, and is at times negative. It is almost never signiﬁcant. There
is therefore only weak empirical support for the idea that greater capital controls regularly led to lower interest rates. Other
authors (Wyplosz, 1999), using diﬀerent data, ﬁnd slightly larger}and strongly signiﬁcant}eﬀects. The maximum coeﬃcient on a
simple dummy variable for capital controls is 2.69, while the smallest is 0.95.
36. If the risk-free rate rises by 1.6%, and the cost of equity falls by 2.8% , the net eﬀect of liberalization for the cost of capital will be
positive if the debt is less than 64% of total capital. For a reduction in the cost of equity by 3.8%, the upper bound on debt is 70%.
37. Eichengreen (1993). He argues that trade discrimination was essential for encouraging trade, and entailed no important negative
consequences given the competitiveness of European manufacturers. Thus, ‘the EPU oﬀered the best of both possible worlds’.
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